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THE ROLE OF EMPLOYMENT AND WORK IN POVERTY 
ERADICATION AND EMPOWERMENT AND ADVANCEMENT 
OF WOMEN 
 
Introduction 
 
The Asian economic crisis which began with the floating of the bhat by 
Thailand on July 1 1997 is still having devastating effects on the 
livelihood and the well being of millions of people in many parts of the 
world.  The financial crisis spread from Thailand to other Asian 
countries, subsequently to Russia and more recently to Brazil. 
Fortunately, timely and decisive action by the US Federal Reserve last 
autumn (instituting three successive reductions in interest rates) has 
enabled advanced countries to escape the crisis so far. Nevertheless it is 
estimated by the World Bank that as a consequence of the crisis the rate 
of growth of world GDP is 2 percentage points lower both in 1998 and in 
1999 than it would otherwise have been.  A rough calculation shows that 
this amounts to a huge loss over these two years of $120 per capita in 
production or income for each man, woman and child in the world.  This 
also suggests indirectly that hundreds of millions of people in poor 
countries who live on a dollar a day or less are likely to have become 
considerably poorer still as a result of the crisis.  
 
The burden of this lost output, employment and incomes is of course not 
evenly distributed.  Rather it has fallen disproportionately on the poor 
and especially on the women in the countries most affected by the crisis.  
Hence there has been  a massive increase in poverty, unemployment and 
under-employment as well as huge reductions in real wages in countries 
like Indonesia and Thailand as we shall see in the following sections. 
 
However despite the current serious problems in the world economy and 
its negative implications for poverty and jobs, if we look at these 
phenomena in a longer term perspective the picture is rather different.  
During the last half century humanity has achieved historically 
unprecedented increases in nutrition, health, education, life expectation 
and reduction in material poverty. Experiences differ between countries 
and have varied over time but on average it is arguable that people in the 
developing world have recorded more material economic progress 
between 1950 - 1980 than they did in the last three thousand years.
1
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   This point is discussed in detail in Patel (1995); see also section II below. 
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Although economic growth has slowed down after 1980 in Latin 
America and Africa, it continued apace in Asia until the present crisis. 
However it is important to remember that despite the increase in poverty 
caused by the debt crisis and the so-called ‘lost decade’ of the 1980s in 
Latin America, there has been significant progress in democracy and 
empowerment of the people on that continent. 
 
The last fifty years have yielded many important lessons about poverty, 
its consequences, its relationship to other variables such as employment 
and economic growth. There have also been outstanding success stories 
in poverty reduction as well as abject failures. But the important point of 
this historical experience, and the associated analytical efforts to explore 
poverty in its various dimensions, is that poverty can be greatly 
diminished and indeed eliminated altogether throughout the world in a 
relatively short time. Humanity in principle has the resources and the 
capacity to do so.  This paper will discuss the conditions necessary and 
the policies required to achieve this vast and worthy objective. 
 
In his recent proposal for a comprehensive framework for development 
the President of the World bank, James Wolfensohn, has observed: “ 
While macroeconomic management is never perfect - there will always 
be some fluctuations in output and employment - the most effective 
safety net is a policy which maintains full employment. Deep recessions 
and depressions have adverse effects on virtually every one of the 
elements of the development strategy: health deteriorates, schooling is 
interrupted, and poverty increases. Formal safety nets are but an 
imperfect stop-gap measure in addressing the failures of effective macro 
policies to maintain the economy at full employment”. 
 
Wolfensohn  is right to stress the role of employment as the most 
effective way of dealing with poverty. Indeed in the way that our 
societies are presently organised most people would accept that 
unemployment is not only an economic waste, but also leads to social 
degradation with serious consequences for the individual and society. It 
lowers self-esteem, is demotivating, creates insecurity, resistance to 
technical change, among other things. Unemployment is deeply 
damaging to the status of the citizen. The question of unemployment is 
crucial because of its all-pervading, comprehensive economic and social 
linkages. Moreover, history tells us that if unemployment reaches a high 
level, it often gives rise to economic and political strife. 
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Although unemployment has been greatly exacerbated in many 
developing countries by the present crisis, it is an extremely important 
continuing long-term problem for almost all developing countries. It is 
also a central policy concern in many advanced countries. 
 
In view of the above considerations, this paper concentrates on the 
question of employment. It focuses on the key issues of the inter-
relationship between growth, employment and poverty, and pays 
particular attention to the gender dimensions of employment and poverty. 
These topics are considered here in the context of the globalisation and 
the liberalisation of the world economy. The emphasis of the paper is on 
policy: what should be done to eradicate poverty, to provide 
remunerative jobs to all those who want them and to establish gender 
equality. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows.  The next section considers 
in historical perspective the achievements of the developing world with 
respect to reducing poverty and outlines the nature and dimensions of the 
task that remains to be accomplished.  Section III reviews evidence on 
the salient characteristics of labour markets in both developed and 
developing countries, paying particular attention to issues of 
unemployment, underemployment and real wages.  Section IV outlines 
the consequences of the Asian crisis for poverty, unemployment and real 
wages.  Section V identifies the short- and long-term policy issues and 
examines, both analytically and empirically, the interrelationship 
between poverty, employment and economic growth.  Section VI 
considers other relevant issues, specifically the relationship between 
technological change and unemployment; it also considers factors other 
than economic growth that may have a major affect on poverty, such as 
income instability, inflation and fiscal policy.  Sections VII and VIII 
outline policy measures for creating adequately remunerative work 
opportunities to aid in the elimination of global poverty and its attendant 
instability, insecurity and extreme deprivation. 
 
Finally it may be useful to note that although this paper considers 
conditions in both developed and developing countries, it pays greater 
attention to the latter as they comprise 80 per cent of humanity and their 
economic condition is far worse than that of advanced countries. 
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II.  POVERTY AND EMPLOYMENT: ACHIEVEMENT AND 
CHALLENGE 
 
Confronted with the enormous current and accumulated developmental 
problems of the poor countries, it is easy to lose sight of the achievement 
which humanity has made in alleviating poverty and deprivation during 
the last half century.  It is therefore important to consider the economic 
and social progress which has been made during this period in a 
historical perspective.  This is not just an academic point but one which 
has a enduring policy relevance.  Apart from drawing policy lessons from 
past experience, historical perspective can also point towards 
possibilities for the future.          
 
II.1.  Economic and social progress in developing countries in historical 
perspective 
 
During the second half of the twentieth century developing countries as a 
whole made unprecedented economic progress.  Taking advantage of the 
propitious circumstances which opened up at the end of the Second 
World War, these countries embarked effectively on an industrial 
revolution.
2
  Between 1950 - 1980 they made remarkable economic and 
industrial progress.  In statistical terms during this period, the 130 or so 
developing countries (the South) with over 3.5 billion people expanded 
their production at an annual growth rate of nearly 5.5 per cent per 
annum, thus achieving a nearly fivefold increase in total output.  The 
South’s growth rate during this period was ten times higher than its own 
growth rate in the previous half century; it surpassed the growth rate 
achieved in the advanced countries’ (the North’s) industrial revolution in 
the 19
th
 century (1820 - 1900).  The South recorded the same 
proportionate increase in production as the North did during its period of 
rapid industrialisation, but the South accomplished this in half the time, 
at twice the growth rates and with five times the North’s population in 
the 19
th
 century.
3
  
 
Patel (1995) provides data to show that, in the four decades following 
World War II, the South as a whole achieved an even more spectacular 
advance in the social field than in the economic field. This is evidenced 
by the following:  
                                                          
2
   The propitious circumstances included political independence of a large number of developing 
countries; the contention between two systems - the US-led liberal capitalism and the USSR-led state-
planning system under party direction - which provided aid as well as space for developing countries to 
industrialise quickly and achieve faster economic growth.  See further Singh (1995).   
3
   The source of the statistics used in this and the following paragraphs is Patel (1995, 1996). 
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1. Infant mortality rate (IMR)  in the South fell in the past four       
decades from about 250 to 70 per thousand. Eighteen South 
countries with a combined population of 1.5 billion have already 
reached the IMR of only 30 per thousand, current in the West up 
to the 1950s. 
 
2.  Life expectancy rose from around 35 years to 60-70 years by the 
late 1980s. The South has thereby added 25-35 years to the 
average life of each of its newly born citizens - or doubled the 
average life span. Everywhere women’s life expectation rose 
more than that of men. 
 
3.  In the mid-19th century, literacy rates in the North ranged from 
about 60 per cent in England and the US to a low of 20 per cent 
in Spain and  10 per cent in Italy. The average in the North was 
probably not more than 25 per cent in 1850 and 50 per cent in 
1900. The comparable level in the South was approximately 30 
per cent in 1950. However by the 1980s, it had risen to 50 per 
cent in Africa, 70 per cent in Asia and 80 per cent in Latin 
America.
4
  
 
4. In 1960 the advanced countries had 56 per cent of the world 
total gross number of literate persons with only 44 per cent in the 
developing countries. By 1985 the South’s share had risen to 69 
per cent and that of the North had reduced to 31 per cent. It should 
be pointed out that within the afore-mentioned statistics there was 
a far larger proportion of male literates than female literates - a fact 
which is still true nowadays and needs to be addressed. 
 
 
II.2.  Regional differences and changes over time in poverty levels  
 
Although economic growth is not the only determinant of poverty, there 
is nevertheless a negative relationship between the two variables. The 
fast growth of GDP in developing countries during this post WWII 
period resulted in sizeable reductions in poverty.  Chart 1 shows the 
impressive results for the most populous Asian countries in reducing 
“income poverty” - the proportion of people whose income fall below the 
                                                          
4
  Literacy levels are of course difficult to compare over countries and over time, and literates in the 
North may be much more literate than those in the South. Nevertheless, the statement in the text is 
indicative of more trends.  
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official poverty line.
5
  Particularly striking in this respect is the record of 
Indonesia.  In 1970, over 60 percent of the Indonesian population was 
living below the poverty line; by 1996 the proportion had fallen to 12 
percent.  This is quite remarkable, especially if one considers the fact that 
the country’s population rose from 117 million to 200 million during this 
period.   
 
The Latin American countries also achieved sizeable reductions in 
poverty during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s.  However, in the 1980s 
poverty increased in Latin America as a consequence of the prolonged 
debt crisis.  Poverty also rose in that decade in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
These inter-regional differences as well as inter-temporal changes in 
poverty levels broadly reflect the regional differences in GDP growth 
rates as well as how they have changed over time (see Chart 2).  Chart 2 
indicates that the GDP growth rate of Latin America and Sub-Saharan 
African countries collapsed in the 1980s whilst those of East Asian 
countries rose even higher from their already high levels.   
 
Despite the rapid progress made by Asian countries in reducing the 
incidence of poverty, South Asia continues to have the highest incidence 
of poverty in the world with over 40 percent of the people living below 
the dollar-a-day poverty line.  After South Asia, the highest incidence of 
poverty is in Sub-Saharan Africa.  What the most recent estimates show 
is that the 266 million of its 590 million people are living below the 
national poverty line.  UNDP (1997) reports that the depth of poverty, i.e. 
how far incomes fall below the poverty line, is greater in Sub-Saharan 
Africa than in other regions. 
 
The information provided in Table 1 suggests that the immediate 
challenge of poverty before humanity is the 1.3 billion people who earn 
less than a dollar-a-day per person at 1985 purchasing power parity. 
Table 2 indicates the social dimension of this challenge: there are close 
to a billion adults who are unable to read or write; three quarters of a 
billion people have no access to health services; 1.2 million people lack 
access to safe water and more than half a million people have a life 
expectation of less than forty years.  
 
 
                                                          
5
   Poverty and social deprivation can be defined in many different ways.  The simplest and the most 
widely used measure is the proportion of people whose income fall below the cut off income level.  In 
their empirical work reported in the Human Development Reports, the UNDP provides a more 
comprehensive definition of poverty which includes deficits in three areas: longevity, knowledge and a 
decent standard of living. 
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II.3 Gender Gap 
 
Table 3 provides information on some indicators of the gender gap for 
different regions, for all developing countries together and for the world 
as a whole. Focusing on developing countries the table indicates that the 
adult literacy rate is sixteen percentage points higher for men than for 
women. UNDP (1997) notes that female school enrolment even at the 
primary level is 13 per cent lower than the male enrolment. Women’s 
share of earned income is a third of the total whilst that of men is two 
thirds. Importantly in UNDP (1997) reports that gender inequality is not 
always associated with “income poverty”. It is however strongly 
correlated with “human poverty” which, as noted earlier in footnote 4, is 
a more comprehensive measure than “income poverty”, as it includes in 
addition indicators of social deprivation. Other aspects of the gender gap 
will be taken up below. 
 
III World Employment, Unemployment and Under-employment 
 
The ILO’s World Employment Report for 1998-1999 estimated that prior 
to the Asian crisis there were 140 billion people in the world who were 
involuntarily unemployed, i.e. they were available and willing to work 
but could not find employment. In addition, a quarter to a third of the 
global labour force of three billion were thought to be under-employed - 
“either working substantially less than full time, but wishing to work 
longer, or earning less than a living wage”. (ILO 1998, p.9). 
 
III.1 Advanced Economies 
 
The employment situation in advanced countries comprising the EU is 
very serious. Sixty years after the Great Depression, during the last 
decade, many of these countries have again been experiencing mass 
unemployment. There are 18 million people unemployed in the EU 
countries, constituting 10 per cent of the labour force. There is double 
digit unemployment in leading EU countries - Germany, France, Italy 
and Spain. Further it is estimated that if the workers who are too 
discouraged to even seek jobs because of large scale unemployment, as 
well as those who are working short hours involuntarily are added, it 
would raise the unemployment figures by another 50 per cent. 
 
In the context of this mass unemployment it is important to remember 
that not too long ago, during the 1950s and 60s, countries like France and 
Germany not only enjoyed full employment but, in fact, had over full 
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employment. Table 5 shows, for example, that the average rate of 
unemployment in the ten years 1964 - 73 was less than 1 per cent of the 
labour force. Moreover in addition to employing their own indigenous 
labour force, France and Germany also provided employment to a very 
large number of immigrant workers who constituted almost 10 per cent 
of the labour force. This raises an obvious but nevertheless extremely 
important question: if full employment was possible twenty years ago 
why is it not possible today in these countries? 
 
III.2 Developing Countries 
 
Turning to developing countries, Table 4 would seem to suggest that the 
recorded rates of unemployment in these countries are quite low. This is 
literally true but the inference that there are very few people who are 
involuntarily unemployed is misleading. This phenomenon arises from 
the fact that these countries are unable to provide public provision of 
insurance against unemployment, so that those who are unemployed are 
obliged to work (often in the informal sector) however unremunerative 
the work may be. Thus for developing countries the problem of 
unemployment manifests itself mainly in the form of ‘disguised’ 
unemployment (i.e. work with very low productivity or return) or under-
employment. Therefore, the question of unemployment in the case of the 
developing countries must be considered in conjunction with that of 
productivity growth and under-employment. 
 
These points are well illustrated by Table 6 which provides information 
on economic activity, employment and real wages for Latin American 
countries from 1980 - 1995. The table indicates that although the rate of 
open unemployment has only been 7 - 8 per cent in the 1990s, there has 
been huge increase in informal sector employment. Tokman (1997) 
estimates that 8 out of every 10 new jobs created during this period have 
been low paying jobs in the informal sector. There has thus been an 
informalisation of the Latin American labour market, with a proportion 
of informal sector jobs increasing from about 40 per cent in 1980 to over 
55 per cent in 1995. It is interesting that although the Latin American 
economies have been growing during the 1990s following the resumption 
of capital flows, there has been no increase in real wages since 1980. 
Minimum wages in 1995 were 30 per cent below what they were in 1980. 
 
The contrast with the evolution of the East Asian labour markets during 
the same period could not be more striking. In these countries as Table 7 
indicates there has been a sizeable increase in real wages, to the order of 
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5 per cent per annum. Further, evidence suggests that the increase in 
employment which has occurred has taken place the formal sector and 
the size of the informal sector has in fact shrunk as a consequence in 
some countries. Thus the East Asian countries before the present crisis 
were able to create not only enough jobs for those who needed them but 
created good jobs with rising real wages. Indeed, prior to the crisis, some 
of these hitherto labour surplus economies found themselves with labour 
shortages and began to employ a considerable number of immigrant 
workers from neighbouring countries. 
 
 
III.3  Gender Gap 
 
The more reliable and more complete information on the gender gap in 
the labour markets is unfortunately available only for advanced 
economies. (See Tables 8 and 9). The most relevant points for this paper 
may be summarised as follows: 
 
1.  Over the last twenty years female employment has increased at a much 
faster rate than male employment. Nevertheless a greater proportion of 
women are involuntarily unemployed than men. 
  
2.  There has been a huge increase in labour force participation rates of 
women while that for men has declined. Between 1973 - 1992 the 
average male participation rates in OECD Europe fell by nearly a 
quarter while the female rates increased by a quarter. (See Table 8). 
 
3.  The earnings gap between men and women is considerably lower now 
in industrial countries than it was twenty years ago. (see Table 9). 
 
 
Thus, though there has been progress over the last two decades in closing 
the gender gap, important differences in the treatment of men and women 
in the labour market in all these areas still remain.
6
 
 
It has been suggested that the fact that men have been losing jobs or 
withdrawing from the labour market while women have been increasing 
participation and gaining jobs implies that women’s gains have been at 
                                                          
6
 The above summary of the gender gap in the labour market refers only to a few areas central to the 
subject of this paper - the issue of poverty. For more comprehensive analyses of the gender gap, see 
among others UNDP (1997, 1998), Beneria and Feldman (1992), Dex (1985), Folbre (1994), Jenson, 
Hagen and Reddy (1988a), Rowthorn (1992) and Singh (1987a). 
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the expense of men. However as Howes and Singh (1995) note this 
generalisation is not valid. They argue that given a persistent gender 
division of labour, mass unemployment in advanced countries is due to 
different forces operating on men and women. The rate of the growth of 
men’s jobs has fallen because of de-industrialisation but men have not 
withdrawn from the labour force at a comparable rate. Women have been 
entering the labour force in “feminised” jobs, usually in the low-paying 
service sector, at a faster rate than such jobs have materialised. 
 
Turning to developing countries, in an influential paper, Standing (1989) 
advanced the theory of the “feminisation” of the labour force in the 
South. The essential argument is that much as in advanced countries, in 
the poor countries as well, there has been an appreciable increase in 
female participation rates while male rates have declined. Standing 
attributes this to increased international competition as well as structural 
adjustment policies in developing countries which he believes have 
worsened income distribution. This has obliged women to enter the 
labour force to supplement the family income. Employers have been 
equally keen to substitute cheap, non-unionised and more flexible female 
labour for the more expensive male labour. The feminisation thesis, 
however, is controversial; there is some dispute about facts but more so 
about the interpretation of the evidence.
7
 
 
 
III.3. Conclusion 
 
To sum up, this analysis and review of the available information on 
poverty and employment issues, particularly in relation to the developing 
countries (prior to the Asian crisis),  has shown that these countries, 
when considered from an historical perspective, have made enormous 
economic and social progress in the last fifty years. There is, however, a 
great deal still to be done if the minimum standards of decent life are to 
be provided to a billion people who presently fall below that standard. 
The complementary task of providing adequately remunerative jobs for 
all those who need them is also a large one. But neither of these 
objectives is hopeless, as the record of developing countries as a whole 
during the period 1950 - 1980, and that of Asian countries in the last two 
decades before the crisis, suggests.  
 
The next section will discuss the effects of the Asian crisis on poverty 
and employment. It will be seen that the analysis of these effects makes 
                                                          
7
 See further Elson (1995), Cagatay and Ozler (1995), Hughes and Singh (1995). 
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the task of poverty alleviation and meeting the employment needs of the 
people more complicated but it does not change the essential picture 
outlined above. 
 
 
IV The Asian Crisis: Consequences for Poverty and Employment 
 
Due to the proximity of the crisis, precise information on its social 
consequences in the most affected Asian countries will not be available 
for some time. Nevertheless some of the best available estimates from the 
World bank on poverty, real wages and employment are summarised in 
Table 10 and Chart 3. These suggest that assuming no change in the 
distribution of income and using $1 a day poverty line for Indonesia and 
the Philippines and $2 a day for Malaysian and Thailand, 17 million 
more people in Indonesia will have fallen below the poverty line in 1998, 
2.3 million more in Thailand, 665000 in the Philippines and just under 
half a million in Malaysia. Poverty figures are very sensitive to 
deterioration in income distribution as well as to the definition of the 
poverty line. Since many people in a country like Indonesia live only 
slightly above the $1 a day poverty line, an increase in the poverty line to 
$1.25 a day would raise the number of additional poor people to 22 
million, bringing the total number to 56.5 million. The World Bank also 
estimates that a 10 per cent worsening in the distribution of income, 
which past experience with crises in other countries suggest is more than 
likely, would bring the incidence of poverty in most countries back to the 
level of the early 90s, practically eliminating the effects of ten years of 
growth. 
 
With respect to unemployment, the bank estimates suggest that the 
number unemployed will have risen to about 13 million in Indonesia by 
the end of 1998, 3.5 million in Thailand and 1.6 million in Korea, a total 
of 18 million. This may be compared with a pre-crisis figure of 5.3 
million for the three countries together in 1996. 
 
It may also be worth noting that these figures may well turn out to be the 
lower bound estimates, e.g. the Indonesian government itself thought that 
there would be 20 million unemployed by the end of 1998. Estimates of 
unemployment by different agencies and organisations vary in part due to 
the different assumptions which are made as to what proportion of the 
workers laid off are absorbed in the informal sector in the rural and urban 
areas. 
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As one would expect, not only has the crisis led to increased open 
unemployment and a sharp decrease in wages, there will also have been a 
huge increase in the already high incidence of under-employment. Real 
wages are expected to fall in Indonesia by 40 to 60% in 1998 and by over 
10% in Thailand. The Indonesian figure is considerably higher than that 
suffered by the worst affected Latin American countries after the debt 
crisis of the 1980s. (See Table 10) 
 
Apart from these effects of the crisis on poverty, employment and real 
wages, areas in which governments typically collect statistical data, there 
are other social consequences, just as important, on which less data is 
available or which are not quantifiable at all. For example it would not be 
an exaggeration to suggest that the crisis in Indonesia has been so deep 
that it has damaged the social fabric of the whole society. There has been 
serious unrest and severe persecution of the Chinese minority which may 
have repercussions well beyond Indonesia. 
 
Further, even relatively short periods of  economic contraction  can have 
long term effects on people’s well-being. It is well documented that brief 
periods of malnutrition for children may result in long term damage to 
their mental and physical potential, even if after economic recovery 
nutrition improves. Joseph Stiglitz, the Chief Economist of the World 
Bank, cites reports from Indonesia and Thailand that millions of children 
are not returning for the 1998 school year, as their parents are unable to 
afford the school fees, other educational costs or even spare their 
children’s time. Similarly the destruction or degradation of human capital 
involved in prolonged  lay-off is yet another social cost. This cost is not 
properly measured, if at all, by economists and government statisticians. 
 
Turning to the gender implications of the crisis there is evidence that 
women in the affected countries, despite all the discriminations to which 
they are traditionally subjected, did share in the economic and social 
gains arising from fast economic growth for a long period. There are 
studies which suggest some improvement in women’s position in the 
labour market. However as the World Bank (1998) observes: 
 
“But women and girls may be disproportionately hurt by the financial 
crisis. Women lose their jobs first, and families pull their daughters out 
of school before sons. The particularly hard pressed may sell daughters to 
brothels. Even before the crisis, girls in Indonesia were six times more 
likely than boys to drop out of school before the fourth grade. Once girls 
are removed from school, they rarely go back. 
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Social organisations also point to a rise in domestic violence and 
prostitution. Though gender inequality is not a new problem in the 
region, the crisis situation has exacerbated the difficulties faced by poor 
women and girls in East Asia”. 
 
Finally, the Asian Crisis is not only not yet over even for the Asian 
countries but its reverberations are still spreading to other developing 
countries and regions. The latest victim is Brazil where the value of the 
real has fallen 40 per cent over the last two months. The Economist (6
th
 
March 1999, p.99) reports that even the  normally optimistic Brazilian 
officials estimate that GDP will shrink this year by 4 per cent. The 
January 1999 unemployment figure of 8 per cent was the worst since 
1983, when records began. Further, despite a deep recession, prices rose 
by nearly 4 per cent in February 1999. In addition, the new agreement 
between the Brazilian government and the IMF is likely to call for a 
bigger fiscal squeeze to ensure a public sector ‘primary’ surplus (before 
interest payments) of more than 3 per cent of GDP this year. This would 
entail more spending cuts probably including important items in the 
social sphere. 
 
 
V  Poverty, Employment and Long Term Economic Growth 
 
V.1 Short and Long Term Policy Issues 
 
The policy questions raised by the previous discussion are: 
 
a.  What should be done in the short term to cope with the  
economic and social consequences of the Asian crisis; 
 
b. What kind of policies are required in the long term to promote 
employment and to eliminate human poverty around the globe at 
least in the narrow material sense indicated earlier? 
 
It will be immediately recognised that there is a potential conflict 
between a) and b). Short term measures such as government transfer 
payments to the poor may relieve immediate hardship but these may be at 
the expense of long term investment which creates jobs in the future. 
There are clearly trade-offs here which must be explicitly taken into 
account by policy makers. It is also important to recognise that the inter-
temporal choices between current and future consumption may be rather 
different for the poor and the not-so-poor - the former giving greater 
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weight to current consumption. These issues will be taken up later when 
short term policy is considered. It will however be best to start first with 
the analytical and empirical issues connected with poverty alleviation 
and the expansion of adequately remunerative employment. 
 
 
V.2 Poverty - Employment - Growth Nexus: Analytical and Empirical 
Considerations 
 
At the microeconomic level there is an obvious relationship between 
poverty and employment. A reasonably remunerative job will help keep a 
family out of poverty. At the macroeconomic level, the relationship 
between these variables is still close but much less obvious. It is indirect 
and the linkage is provided through the intervening variable of economic 
growth. The creation of sufficient employment opportunities with 
adequate levels of real wages requires a reasonable rate of economic 
growth; so does the eradication of poverty and meeting the minimum 
basic needs of the people. The causal mechanism in each case is however 
somewhat different; these will be elaborated below.  
 
V.2a Poverty and Growth 
 
Although at any moment of time a redistribution of incomes may enable 
a society to better meet the basic needs of its poorest people, this can 
only be done on a sustainable basis if there is a continuing expansion of 
the national economy. Economic growth increases household incomes, 
and as will be explained in greater detail below, it also generates more 
jobs. Further, it increases government revenues which may be spent on 
health, education, clear water supplies and other basic needs of the 
people. 
 
Empirical evidence indicates a robust negative relationship between 
poverty and economic growth. This was an important reason why the 
East Asian region experienced such a sharp reduction in poverty over the 
last two decades. This is also the reason why with slow growth during the 
1980s poverty rose in Latin America as well as Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
Although there is an overall negative relationship between poverty and 
economic growth, it is by no means a perfect relationship. The 
responsiveness of poverty to growth varies between countries. Assuming 
distributional neutrality, studies suggest that in the late 1980s, in 
Malaysia and in Thailand, a 1 per cent increase in growth in mean 
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incomes was associated with a 3.5 per cent reduction in poverty; in 
Indonesia the corresponding value of elasticity was 2.8 per cent; it was 
less than 2 per cent in most of Sub-Saharan Africa and less than 1 per 
cent in Brazil. The essential reason for the differences in the values of 
these elasticities is that growth is not the only determinant of poverty: the 
latter also depends importantly on a host of other variables  including for 
example: distribution of income, inflation, and employment elasticity of 
growth (i.e. whether growth is more or less labour intensive). Thus it is 
not growth alone, but also its characteristics which affect poverty. 
8
 
Factors other than growth which also influence poverty will be 
commented on in the next section. 
 
V 2.b Employment, Growth and Productivity in Developing Countries 
 
Turning to employment, for developing countries, as noted earlier, the 
problem of unemployment manifests itself mainly in the form of low 
productivity, low wage, “disguised” unemployment or under-
employment. Nevertheless, many countries in Latin America and SSA 
have been experiencing relatively high rates of open unemployment as 
well as massive under-employment. The main employment challenge 
facing these countries is however much more formidable than just 
meeting the employment needs of those who are currently unemployed or 
under-employed. The challenge lies in the fact that the labour force in 
many of these countries in these two regions is growing at approximately 
3 per cent a year.  
 
Before the Asian crisis, the employment situation in South East and East 
Asia was much more promising. The labour markets were tight, 
productivity was growing at a fast pace and workers were enjoying rising 
real wages. Moreover, the expected rate of growth of the labour force 
was considerably lower than in Latin America and the SSA. But even 
here there are potentially difficult problems for the populous countries 
such as Indonesia and China. These arise from the fact that in these 
countries a large proportion of the population is still employed in low 
productivity agriculture. To raise productivity agriculture needs to shed 
labour but it can only do so if there is a sufficient increase in 
remunerative employment opportunities in urban industry and services.  
 
Thus even before the Asian crisis most developing countries faced an 
awesome employment problem. Although in general there is a positive 
                                                          
8
 See further World Bank (1998),see also World Bank (1993), Demerey, Sen and Vishwanath (1995), 
Ahuja et al (1997), Watkins (1998), Ranis and Stewart (1999) 
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relationship between employment and growth, in the case of developing 
countries, it must be carefully interpreted. Employment in the formal 
sector normally expands only in response to the growth or the expected 
growth of output; in the informal sector, however, it may expand without 
any expansion of output. Informal sector employment may indeed expand 
even more with a decline in output which lowers incomes and obliges 
more people to engage in informal employment in order to maintain 
family income. It is therefore important in considering the relationship 
between output and employment in developing countries to also consider 
the inter-relationship of the two variables with productivity.  
 
The aggregate data on output, employment and productivity in Table 11 
for three developing regions illustrates some of these points. It shows 
that employment expanded at a faster rate in Latin America than in Asia 
during both periods (the mid 1970s - 1984, 1985 - the early 1990s) but in 
Latin America it was associated with falling or more or less stagnant 
productivity, whereas in Asia productivity rose at a creditable rate of 3 
per cent or more per annum. In the second period in SSA, the rate of 
growth and employment was only 1.5 per cent compared with a labour 
force growth rate of about 3 per cent and productivity was stagnant. This 
would suggest that African countries had the worst of both worlds: 
neither sufficient employment expansion even in the informal sector nor 
any productivity growth.
9
 
 
Studies based on the period 1950 - 1980 when developing countries as a 
whole enjoyed fast economic growth suggest that in order for 
employment to increase at a rate of 3 percent per annum to meet the 
needs of new entrants to the labour force, GDP must increase on average 
at about 5-6 per cent per annum so as to be able to maintain the share of 
labour in total income. This would entail a rise in the long term rate of 
growth of productivity and real wages of the order of 2-3 per cent per 
annum. This conclusion is also compatible with the more recent data in 
Table 11. Coincidentally, UNDP (1997) has estimated that in order to 
eliminate poverty over the next two decades, developing countries need 
to grow at a rate of 6 per cent per annum.  
 
These considerations suggest that a trend rate of growth of 6 per cent per 
annum for developing countries may be regarded as the minimum 
socially necessary rate which would both remove poverty and meet the 
employment needs of a rapidly growing labour force. However, if the 
                                                          
9
 This data pertains to a sample of eight countries in SSA, ten countries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, nine countries in South and East Asia. See further Pieper (1998). 
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existing unemployment and under-employment is also to be reduced, the 
growth in GDP would need to be higher still.  
 
 
V.2.c Unemployment , Labour Markets and Economic Growth in 
Advanced Countries 
 
It was seen earlier that European countries are experiencing mass 
unemployment in the 1990s, yet less than twenty five years ago they had 
a prolonged period (‘golden age’) of not just full employment but over-
full employment in a number of countries. The main difference between 
these two periods is not labour market which some international financial 
institutions claim as being the main reason for the current mass 
unemployment in Europe. The labour markets were if anything less 
flexible in the ‘golden age’ than they have been subsequently. The 
essential reason for Europe’s outstanding employment performance in 
the earlier period was the much faster growth of the West European 
economy. Between 1950 - 1973 these countries expanded at a historically 
unprecedented rate of nearly 5 per cent per annum whilst since 1974 the 
long term trend rate of growth of the European economies has fallen to 
half that figure. 
 
The international financial institutions also invoke the flexibility of the 
US labour market compared with that of the West European market to 
suggest why there is more or less full employment in the US and high 
unemployment in Europe. There is a kernel of truth in this argument in 
that the lower US unemployment rate is indeed partly due to the lack of 
public provision for the relief of unemployment in the US relative to 
Western Europe. US workers are therefore obliged to take jobs, any jobs, 
regardless of how remunerative they may be. It is notable that there was 
no increase in the real wages of manual workers in the US between 1973 
- 1993. 
 
A little reflection will show that nevertheless the labour market 
flexibility argument is inadequate to account for the differing 
unemployment experiences of Western Europe and the US. To see this, 
consider for example labour markets and employment in West Germany 
and the US. The former has a comparatively inflexible labour market, but 
this is not only true today, it was also so in the ‘golden age’. However, in 
the ‘golden age’, West Germany managed to achieve full employment 
while the US did not. Moreover, the growth of real wages in West 
Germany in this earlier period was considerably faster than in the US. 
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The key to this puzzle lies in the fact that West Germany in that period 
was growing much faster than either its current rate, or that of the US 
(whether now or in the earlier period). 
 
As noted in Singh (1995), the same difficulty with the labour market 
flexibility hypothesis arises in explaining the differences in levels of 
unemployment between the Great Depression and the Post War period. 
The labour market was much more flexible in the earlier compared with 
the subsequent period . Matthews and Bowen (1998) show that real 
product wages rose far more in the 1950s and 1960s in the UK compared 
with the 1930s, yet the earlier period had the Great Depression and the 
later period more or less full employment. 
 
Returning to the present case of the US economy, it is important to note 
that a major blemish in the US economic record is that, although labour 
markets appear to be tight and there are high levels of unemployment, 
real wages have hardly risen at all in the last twenty five years. Both 
productivity growth and per capita income growth, though not as slow as 
wage growth, have been well below that of the major OECD countries. 
(Howes and Singh,1995) This has meant that the normal expectation of 
the American people, that each generation’s standard of living will be 
twice that of the previous one, is no longer being realised. 
 
Howes and Singh (forthcoming) argue that the main reason for the 
stagnation of real wages in the US, like that of the high unemployment 
rates in Europe is that the economy in the post - 1973 period has been 
expanding at a lower long term rate than before.
10
 Between 1960 and 
1973 US GDP grew at an annual rate of 4 per cent, compared with 2.3 
per cent since 1973. The higher growth rate of the earlier period not only 
enabled the country to have a better employment record than it has done 
subsequently; more significantly it also made it possible for real wages to 
increase at a rate of about 2 per cent per annum in that period.
11
 
 
                                                          
10
 Due to the fact that productivity growth is so much higher in Europe than in the US, the consequence 
of equally slow rates of growth in the two regions has been high unemployment in Europe and full 
employment with stagnant real wages for the US. Given the differences in labour market institutions, to 
achieve full employment in Europe would require rates of growth comparable to those of the ‘golden 
age’ in the range of 5 per cent annually. The US can achieve full employment at lower rates of growth 
productivity growth is so low. However, rising standards of living will require higher rates of 
productivity growth. 
11
 The average real earnings for non-supervisory workers in the US declined at a rate of 0.6 per cent per 
annum in the 1970s, I per cent in the 1980s and 0.6 per cent per annum between 1990 and 1995. In 
contrast in the 1950s and 1960s the corresponding average real earnings rose at a rate of 2 per cent per 
annum (Mishel, Bernstein and Schmitt, 1997). 
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Thus to meet the historic aspirations of US citizens, it is not enough for 
the economy to generate high levels of employment, it must do so with 
growing real wages. This can, however, only be accomplished if there is 
a trend increase in the post-1973 long term growth rate of the US 
economy, to the rates that were experienced in the 1950s. 
 
Lastly and incidentally it is also useful to reflect upon the fact that the 
broad experience of developing countries since 1980 also provides little 
support for the labour market flexibility thesis. During the 1980s, 
workers in Latin America saw sizeable reductions in their wages and also 
increasing unemployment. In Mexico, for example, real wages fell by 50 
per cent between 1980 and 1988. This was accompanied by a much 
slower, rather than a faster, growth of modern sector employment than 
before and increasing informalisation of the economy. In contrast, in the 
East and South East Asian newly industrialising countries, in the last 
fifteen years real wages increased at a rate of 5 per cent a year and so did 
modern sector employment. It would be difficult to ascribe the very 
different employment records of the Asian and Latin American newly 
industrialising countries (NICs) in the 1980s and 1990s to the relative 
flexibility or inflexibility of their labour markets. Rather these 
differences arose from the fact that the Asian NICs expanded at a much 
faster rate than the Latin American ones during that period. 
 
 
 
VI  Technology, Jobless Growth and other Determinants of 
Employment and Poverty 
 
VI.1  Technology and Employment 
 
The thesis outlined above suggests that in order to meet the employment 
needs of the people and to reduce poverty it is necessary to have a trend 
increase in the rate of growth of production in both developed and 
developing countries. There is however a very important objection to this 
thesis which needs careful consideration. This relates to the role of 
technology. 
 
With widespread redundancies ,the “downsizing” of businesses and job 
insecurity throughout the industrial world, it is commonplace to blame 
technology for these events. It is argued that the main reason for 
unemployment is the much faster pace of technological progress which 
results in replacing people by machines. 
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However, evidence at least at the aggregate macro-economic level 
suggests that this argument is hard to sustain either for developed or 
developing countries. The following points are relevant. 
1)  Evidence for industrial countries suggests there has been a trend 
reduction in their rate of growth of productivity during the last fifteen 
to twenty years rather than a trend increase. Productivity growth 
during this period has been half of what it was during the 1950s and 
60s when there was full employment. Had the pace of technical 
progress been actually faster, there would have been an improvement 
in the average  productivity growth rather than the substantial 
observed decline.  So although in individual industries faster technical 
progress may have caused redundancies, this factor cannot account for 
the overall observed increase in unemployment in industrial countries. 
 
2)  A variation on the above theme is the argument about “jobless 
growth”.  The suggestion here is that because of the nature of 
technical change, economic growth no longer creates jobs. This 
proposition may be put in a less extreme form in the economist’s 
jargon as suggesting that the employment elasticity of growth has 
fallen. Evidence, however, does not back up this claim.  
 
The data for industrial countries  shows that the growth rate required 
before the economy starts creating net new jobs has been less in the 
period 1974 to 1995 than during 1960 to 1973.  This reflects the lower 
average productivity growth of the later period.
12
  In the US for 
example the annual growth rate required for the economy to start 
creating net additional jobs during 1960-1973 was 2.3 per cent; 
between 1974-1995, the corresponding rate has only been 0.7per cent.  
 
 Further, cross-section econometric evidence for advanced industrial 
countries suggests, if anything, an increase over time in the 
employment elasticity of output growth rather than a decrease, as the 
hypothesis of jobless growth would imply. Boltho and Glyn(1995) 
report that employment elasticity of GDP growth for advanced 
industrial countries rose from 0.49 per cent during 1975-82 to 0.63per 
cent during 1982-93. The reason why unemployment or under-
employment has increased so steeply in all these countries  is not that 
‘growth’ does not create as many jobs as before, but that there has been 
much slower growth than before. 
                                                          
12
  See further, ILO(1996). 
 21 
 
3)  The above argument about the alleged negative role of technology is 
much more plausible for advanced countries than for developing 
countries which are not on the cutting edge of technology. 
Nevertheless, in developing countries there is no evidence of any 
significant reductions in the employment elasticity of output over time. 
There are however some anomalies in this area which require 
comment. First, in the case of Latin American countries it has been 
noted that although economic growth resumed in the 1990s 
employment has not increased at the same rate as before. This implied 
reduction in employment elasticity is however not attributed to 
technology but to liberalisation of trade which these countries have 
undertaken (Frenkel 1998). The other case of apparently falling 
employment elasticity relates to India where this elasticity is estimated 
to have fallen quite considerably in the formal manufacturing sector. 
This phenomena has not been adequately studied. But a reasonable 
hypothesis would be that it is due to internal liberalisation and de-
regulation of the Indian economy. There has also been external 
liberalisation in the 1980s and 90s but this has not been any where as 
extensive as in Latin America. However, the internal de-regulation and 
the end of the “permit Raj” has been more far reaching. 
  
4)  Finally, there is a paradox about the role of technology with respect to 
current economic events. Scholars in this area regard information and 
communications technology as representing a new technical paradigm, 
on a par with the steam engine and electricity, as being among the 
most significant technological revolutions of the last two centuries.  
The fact that despite the availability of this revolutionary new 
technology, productivity growth has fallen rather than improved, 
suggests that its potential is not being realised. Closer analysis 
indicates that this can be ascribed to insufficient growth of aggregate 
real demand and output.
13
 If the rate of growth of real aggregate 
demand was higher, this technology would have more widespread use 
in most branches of industry and services, reducing their prices and as 
in the case of previous technical revolutions leading to a virtuous 
circle of increased demand and increased growth of productivity. In 
short, the unutilised potential of the ICT revolution suggests that the 
rate of growth of GDP in industrial countries is certainly not 
constrained by supply. If there are constraints, it is to the factors on the 
demand side that we should look. 
 
                                                          
13
 For a fuller discussion of these issues see Singh (1997), Howes and Singh (forthcoming) 
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VI.2   Determinants of Poverty other than Growth 
 
As noted in Section V there are important determinants of poverty other 
than growth which need to be considered in formulating policy. Research 
on questions of poverty suggest that the most important of these are the 
following: 
 
a.  Rate of inflation. 
b.  Income distribution. 
c.  Initial distribution of land and other assets. 
d.  Stability of economic growth. 
e.  The governments fiscal policies. 
 
Briefly, studies for both Asian and Latin American countries suggest that 
other things being equal, inflation  and specifically unanticipated 
inflation hurt the poor. In the recent period there is evidence from Latin 
America that stabilisation of prices leads to an increase in the standard of 
living of the poor, which accounts for the electoral popularity of 
stabilisation programmes such as those undertaken in Argentina under 
President Menem and in Brazil under President Cordoso when he was the 
Finance Minister in the previous government. 
 
Arguably from a gender perspective, the most significant of these 
additional factors which affect poverty is economic instability, i.e. the 
frequency and the amplitude of the economic cycles. Most developing 
countries do not have, and are unlikely to have for a long time, a publicly 
provided social security system. The burden of coping with 
unemployment and reduced wages in cyclical downturns therefore falls 
on the families and  hence on  women. 
 
Finally, public policy and government expenditure patterns with respect 
to education, health and other social fields clearly have a major impact on 
poverty and deprivation.  
 
VII Long term Policy to Achieve full Employment and Eliminate 
Poverty 
 
The above analysis has shown that in order to reduce global poverty, 
unemployment and under-employment it is necessary to have fast, stable 
(i.e. non-fluctuating) and non-inflationary economic growth. It is also 
important to have a re-distributive fiscal policy. The important long term 
policy question is therefore how developing countries can achieve such 
 23 
socially necessary minimum growth rates as well as the right kind of 
growth. Similarly in order to remove the scourge of mass unemployment 
and to restore full employment what policy and/or institutional changes 
are required for industrial countries to return to the pace of growth they 
achieved in the golden age. However before these policy questions can 
be satisfactorily addressed there is a prior question of feasibility. Are 
such growth rates feasible for either group of countries?  It has been 
demonstrated in detail elsewhere that the answer to this question is in 
principle an affirmative one. 
 
As noted earlier, because of the existence of the large backlog of 
unutilised ICT technology and its unrealised potential, the constraints on 
industrial country growth lie on the demand rather than the supply side. 
Thus mankind has the technology and the resources to achieve these 
worthy objectives. To the extent that the failure on the demand side 
prevents it from doing so, it is a self-inflicted wound arising from the 
lack of success in coordinating economic mechanisms. Similarly the 
socially necessary growth rates are perfectly feasible on the supply side 
for developing countries in Asia and Latin America. Despite their under-
development, most of these countries now have the necessary 
organisational capacity and technical skills to achieve such growth; they 
also have a lot of catching up to do. However under liberalisation and 
globalisation, the main constraints on achieving socially necessary 
growth rates for these countries lie on the demand side as well. In order 
to implement this programme of increasing the trend rate of growth of 
real demand in the world economy on a sustainable basis requires action 
and institutional changes at international, national and local levels. 
 
However the most important variation that is required as far as the 
international organisations are concerned is one of fundamental change 
in perspective. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
